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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
vs. ) 
DON LaVON ERICKSON, ) Appeal No. 890125CA 
Priority # 2 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was charged and convicted of Driving While Under 
the Influence of Alcohol pursuant to U.C.A. Section 41-6-44. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC. 
U.C.A. Section 77-35-12 also known as Rule 12, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and Rules 2.8(c) and Rule 3.5, Rules of 
Practice in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State 
of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Don LaVon Erickson ("Erickson") was arrested and 
charged with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol on August 4, 
1988. (See Information.) 
Erickson filed a general Motion to Suppress, and an 
Evidentiary hearing was held on January 26, 1989. (See Motion To 
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Suppress attached hereto in Addendum and Transcript of Hearing.)1 
At the suppression hearing, Judge Payne held that Officer 
Mitchell had probable cause to belief that a crime had been 
committed. (EHT, p. 69, lines 12-14), that Officer Mitchell had 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause to stop Erickson1s 
vehicle (EHT, p. 71, lines 1-7), and that Officer Mitchell had 
probable cause to place Erickson under arrest. (EHT, p. 80, lines 
10-23.) 
The Court did not rule whether a Miranda warning was 
required before conducting field sobriety tests but after a 
person was under arrest. (EHT, p. 95, lines 10-15.) The Court 
did request legal briefs on the issue which neither party 
submitted. 
At trial, the issue regarding the field sobriety tests was 
raised again. Judge Payne ruled that the Motion was not properly 
submitted to the Court and that a Miranda warning was not 
required before field sobriety tests are conducted. (TT, p. 109-
110. ) 
Erickson was convicted by the jury of Driving Under the 
Influence and sentenced the same day. 
FACTS 
1. Deputy Travis Mitchell ("Mitchell") received a call at 
approximately 9:30 p.m. and was informed that there was a fight 
going on at a residence in Altonah and shots had been fired. 
1 Evidentiary Hearing Transcript is hereafter referred to 
as "EHT". 
Trial Transcript is hereafter referred to as !ITT". 
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(TT, p. 75, lines 20-22.) 
2. Mitchell was off duty, but he was called because he 
lived in the area and therefore, he was the closest officer and 
it was a serious situation. (TT, p. 75, lines 20-25.) 
3. As Mitchell was leaving home, the dispatcher called and 
stated that a pickup truck was leaving the scene. The truck was 
described as a long-wheel base, two-wheel drive, having clearance 
lights on top of the cab, and was heading north from the 
residence where the fight was occurring. (EHT, p. 11, lines 8-
19.) 
4. Mitchell lives in the Altonah area and was familiar 
with all the residences along the road upon which the fight scene 
occurred. Mitchell was also familiar with the residents' 
vehicles. (EHT, pp. 14-17.) 
5. There were four (4) residences within one and one-half 
(1 1/2) miles along the dirt road in question and none of the 
people living on that road owned a vehicle which matched the 
description given by the dispatcher. (EHT, p. 14, lines 18-25, 
p. 15, lines 1-8.) 
6. Mitchell traveled north on the Altonah Road to where it 
intersected with the dirt road leading to the fight scene. (EHT, 
p. 12, lines 8-11.) 
7. Mitchell observed a truck traveling on the dirt road 
toward the Altonah highway which matched the description given by 
the dispatcher. (EHT, p. 12, lines 11-14.) 
8. The truck was traveling approximately 50 mph on a dirt 
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road upon which 40 mph is the maximum speed limit. (EHT, p. 26, 
lines 8-15.) 
9. The dirt road is located in a rural area of Duchesne 
County and has very little traffic on it at any time. (EHT, p. 
26, lines 14-19, p. 24, line 7.) 
10. Mitchell has been associated with law enforcement for 
over thirteen (13) years. (EHT, p. 28, lines 13-15.) 
11. Mitchell pulled over the truck at approximately 9:35 
p.m. because it matched the description given by the dispatcher 
and because it was coming from the direction of the fight scene. 
(EHT, p. 14, lines 9-17, TT, p. 85, lines 16-21.) 
12. Erickson got out of his truck and approached Mitchell. 
Mitchell immediately noticed a strong odor of alcohol. (EHT, p. 
26, lines 21-25, p. 27, lines 1-2.) 
13. Erickson confirmed that he had been at the scene of the 
fight and stated that "Johnny and Arnold were over there shooting 
shot guns at each other". (EHT, p. 27, lines 11-15.) 
14. Erickson also admitted that he had been drinking. 
(EHT, p. 28, lines 8-12.) 
15. Mitchell also testified that Erickson was very careful 
and trying to control his actions and speech, and his breathing 
appeared heavy. (EHT, p. 2, lines 19-25, p. 28, lines 1-7.) 
16. Rudy Monson ("Monson"), a member of the Duchesne County 
Search and Rescue arrived at the area where Erickson and Mitchell 
were stopped. (EHT, p. 37, lines 10-11, p. 38, lines 7-14.) 
17. Based on his experience, training and circumstances 
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known to him, and training, Mitchell determined that Erickson 
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. (EHT, p. 29, 
lines 6-10, p. 30, lines 14-17.) 
18. Mitchell placed Erickson under arrest for DUI, took 
Ericksonfs keys and gave the keys and custody of Erickson to 
Monson. (EHT, p. 30, lines 14-17.) Mitchell was with Erickson 
for approximately five (5) minutes. (TT, p. 77, lines 20-23.) 
19. Erickson and Monson waited on the roadside for about 
15-20 minutes. (EHT, p. 39, lines 11-14.) 
20. Monson did not know that Mitchell had placed Erickson 
under arrest. (EHT, p. 38, lines 22-24.) 
21. Utah Highway Patrolman Gustin ("Gustin11) received a 
radio call from Mitchell at about 10:00 p.m. (EHT, p. 42.) 
22. Mitchell told Gustin that Erickson was probably DUI, 
and that Erickson had been left with Monson. (TT, p. 154, lines 
9-22.) 
23. Gustin did not know that Erickson had been placed under 
arrest. (EHT, p. 44, lines 23-25.) 
24. Gustin observed that Erickson had a "thick tongue", was 
having difficulty pronouncing words, was swaying and had watery 
eyes. (TT, p. 157, lines 6-25.) 
25. Gustin asked Erickson to perform three field sobriety 
tests, a horizontal gaze Nystagmus test, a finger-count test and 
walk and turn test. (TT, p. 125, lines 3-4, 13-14, p. 131, lines 
18-23, p. 132, line 11.) 
26. No evidence regarding the results of the horizontal 
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gaze Nystagmus test was received. (TT, p. 130, lines 1-16.) 
27. Gustin testified as to Ericksonfs inability to perform 
either the finger-count test or the walk and turn test. (TT, p. 
131-134.} 
28. Gustin arrested Erickson. (TT, p. 135, lines 23-25.) 
29. After administering an intoxilyzer test at the 
Sheriff's Office, Gustin apprised Erickson of his Miranda rights. 
(TT, p. 145, lines 9-11, p. 13, lines 4-6.) 
30. Erickson agreed to talk to Gustin. (TT, p. 145, lines 
12-14.) 
31. Erickson admitted to drinking a six pack and a half of 
beer earlier in the evening, (TT, p. 146, lines 21-25, p. 147, 
lines 1-12) and that he was under the influence of alcohol. (TT, 
p. 147, lines 10-12. ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. WAS THE STOP OF ERICKSON JUSTIFIED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES? 
Based on the vehicle description, the direction Erickson was 
traveling and the short duration of time from the call reporting 
the vehicle leaving the scene, Mitchell was entitled top stop 
Erickson for investigatory purposes. 
II. DID MITCHELL HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST ERICKSON? 
Based on his thirteen (13) years experience, the odor of 
alcohol on Erickson, Erickson1s admissions that he had been 
drinking and Mitchell's observations, Mitchell had probable cause 
to believe that Erickson had been driving while under the 
influence of alcohol. 
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III. DID GUSTIN HAVE TO ADVISE ERICKSON OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS 
PRIOR TO PERFORMING FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS? 
Miranda applies only to custodial interrogation rather than 
an investigation or interview situation and the protection 
extends only evidence which is testimonial in character. 
Erickson failed to comply with the rules regarding Motions 
to Suppress Evidence, and so this objection should be deemed 
waived pursuant to those rules. 
ARGUMENT 
In State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506 (Utah App., 1989) the Court 
established the standard of review which would apply to all three 
issues in this case. The Court stated "Because of the trial 
court's advantageous position in determining the factual basis 
for a motion to suppress, that determination should not be 
reversed unless it is clearly erroneous." at 509 (citations 
omitted.) Also see State v. Droneburg, 120 Utah Adv Rep 27 (10-
20-89) . 
I. WAS THE STOP OF ERICKSON JUSTIFIED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES? 
Erickson argues in his brief that Monson "observed a vehicle 
matching the general description given by the dispatcher quite a 
ways from the scene of the reported disturbance" (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 7) and had to turn back and go north to assist 
Mitchell. Erickson refers to the Trial Transcript, p. 87-88 
(attached hereto in the addendum). The State does not agree with 
Erickson1s conclusion that Monson saw an "unrelated vehicle". In 
reading Monson's testimony, p. 87, lines 19-25, and p. 88, lines 
1-11, Monson was not "quite a ways from the scene" (Appellant's 
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Brief, p. 7), he was "watching the area to see which direction 
the vehicle was going". Monson did not see a vehicle, but saw 
"clearance lights going up the road". Monson went west out of 
Altamont to watch the "lower end of the area" or the other end of 
the dirt road. Then the dispatcher evidently called and said 
that "the caller from the scene said that truck was going out on 
the north end" so Monson turned around so he could watch the 
north end. The clearance lights Monson saw belonged to 
Ericksonfs truck. Monson was not "ready to follow a separate 
vehicle, meeting the general description". (Appellant!s Brief, 
p. 4.) 
Several courts have held that the police may erect a road 
block and stop all vehicles using an objective standard test 
defined as whether the officers have probable cause to believe a 
serious felony has recently been committed and the officers 
reasonably believe that the perpetrator is using the highways or 
streets. See State v. Gascon, Idaho Ct.App., 1989, Opinion #CA-
171, (10-12-89) 46 Cv.L.1098; State v. Silvernail, 605 P.2d 1279 
(Wash. Ct.App., 1980). 
In State v. Torres, 508 P.2d 534 (1973) the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that in some situations it may be necessary and 
justifiable to set up road blocks and check cars. The court held 
that: 
"the test to be applied on the question as to whether 
there has been a violation of the constitutional rights 
referred to above is one of reasonableness: that is, 
whether fair-minded persons, knowing the facts, and 
taking into consideration not only the rights of the 
individuals involved in the inquiry or search, but also 
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the broader interests of the public to be protected 
from crime and criminals, would regard the conduct of 
the officers as being unreasonable. 
Further pertinent here are these principles: that 
it is primarily the responsibility of the trial court 
to determine the question of reasonableness, and to 
rule upon the admissibility of evidence; that his 
rulings are indulged with a presumption of correctness; 
and that they should not be disturbed unless it clearly 
appears that he was in error." (Citations omitted.) 
Also, most courts allow law enforcement officers to "freeze11 
the situation by stopping and detaining persons present at the 
scene of a recently committed crime of violence for investigative 
purposes without finding a violation of the 4th Amendment. 
In this case, Mitchell was, at most, five (5) minutes from 
the scene, he was familiar with the area, its residents and their 
cars, Erickson's truck matched the description received over the 
radio, there is no evidence that there were any other vehicles in 
the area, Ericksonfs truck was traveling on the dirt road going 
in the same direction as the vehicle leaving the fight scene was 
reported to be traveling, and last, but not least, the area was 
rural Duchesne County (as opposed to downtown Roosevelt or 
Duchesne)2 and there simply were not many other people or 
vehicles around, that shots were fired indicated that a serious 
offense had been committed and the truck with an unknown occupant 
was fleeing the area. 
As the question of reasonableness is a question of fact, the 
State would argue that there are sufficient facts in the record 
2 Duchesne County1s population is approximately 12,500. 
Roosevelt City, Duchesnefs largest city, has a population 
of approximately 4,300. 
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to support Judge Payne's ruling that Mitchell had reasonable 
suspicion to stop Erickson, and Erickson has not proven that 
Judge Payne's ruling was clear error. 
II. DID MITCHELL HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST ERICKSON? 
Probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances 
known to the officer at the time. The facts known to Mitchell at 
the time of arrest were driving at a high rate of speed down a 
dirt road, the odor of alcohol about Erickson, Erickson!s 
admission that he had been drinking, Erickson was breathing 
heavily, and he was moving and speaking "carefully". Based on 
these facts and utilizing his thirteen (13) years of law 
enforcement experience, Mitchell concluded that there was 
probable cause to believe that Erickson was driving under the 
influence of alcohol. Some of these facts may be explained if 
Erickson had said someone at the fight scene had threatened him. 
But, that was not the case and in light of the odor of alcohol 
and Ericksonfs admission that he had been drinking, it was 
probable that the characteristics observed by Mitchell were 
attributable to drunkenness. 
While probable cause does require more than does reasonable 
suspicion, it does not require the officer to be certain beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the individual committed the crime in 
question. 
The State would assert that the facts known to Mitchell at 
the time of Erickson's arrest support a conclusion that there was 
a fair probability that Erickson was driving under the influence 
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of alcohol. 
III. DID GUSTIN HAVE TO ADVISE ERICKSON OF HIS MIRANDA 
RIGHTS PRIOR TO CONDUCTING FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS? 
A. MIRANDA WARNINGS ARE NOT REQUIRED PRIOR TO CONDUCTING 
FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS 
Utah law is clear that a Defendant need not be given a 
Miranda warning prior to performing field sobriety tests. See 
State v. East, Utah, 743 P.2d 1211 (1987), and Salt Lake City v. 
earner, Utah, 664 P.2d 1168 (1983). 
The only additional or new fact which differentiates this 
case from those cases is that Erickson was placed under arrest 
prior to performing the tests. The holding in earner is based 
upon the fact that the field sobriety tests were not requested in 
a custodial setting, i.e., they were requested and taken on a 
public street, no handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns were 
present, the length of the interrogation, e.g., the time it takes 
to perform the tests, was only minutes. The Court concluded that 
fl(t)hese factors do not suggest a custodial setting. The 
environment may have been authoritative but it certainly was not 
coercive or compelling.11 
Because Gustin did not know Erickson was already under 
arrest, the situation in this case is identical to that in Carner 
and East. The tests were performed on the roadside, Ericksonfs 
counsel clearly established that no handcuffs were involved and 
the tests took a short time to perform. Therefore, the State 
would assert that, based on the facts of this case, no Miranda 
warning was required. 
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In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 218, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 
L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) the U.S. Supreme Court held that Miranda 
warnings only applied to evidence of a testimonial or 
communicative nature. In U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 
1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the privilege against self-incrimination "offers no protection 
against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photography, or 
measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in 
court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk or to make a 
particular gesture.11 In Palmer v. State, Alaska, 604 P. 2d 1106 
(1979), the Alaska Supreme Court relied on Schmerber and Wade to 
hold that a Defendant, arrested and in custody at trooper 
headquarters, was not entitled to a Miranda warning prior to 
being given sobriety tests which were video taped. The Court 
held that the video tapes were admissable because the tests were 
not testimonial in character. Further, the Court held that they 
were not the result of custodial interrogation which requires a 
Miranda warning. 
In this case, Gustin asked Erickson to stand to walk and to 
make particular gestures. Clearly, under federal law, this was 
not evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature and 
therefore, Ericksonfs rights under the Miranda decision were not 
violated. 
B. ERICKSON FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES REGARDING 
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS 
Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (U.C.A. Section 
77-35-12) requires Motions to Suppress to be made in writing, 
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stating with particularity the grounds upon which it is made, and 
that it be made at least five (5) days prior to trial. 
Erickson did file a very general Motion to Suppress in 
writing. The State objected pursuant to U.C.A. Section 77-35-12. 
(EHT, p. 4, lines 2-9.) The Court held that the Motion was 
inadequate, but proceeded with the hearing. (EHT, p. 4, lines 
10-16.) It is the Statefs position that Ericksonfs Motion was 
inadequate under the Rules. 
Rule 12 also requires that motions made before the trial be 
determined before the trial. Rule 3.5, Rules of Practice, also 
makes it clear that motions to suppress should be ruled upon 
prior to the summoning of a jury. Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice, 
allows either party to request a motion be submitted for 
decision. At least one purpose of these rules is to avoid 
precisely what happened in this case — a lengthy legal argument 
with the jury excluded from the court room. 
Under these rules, Erickson should have requested that his 
motion be submitted for decision prior to trial. Erickson had 
the duty to follow up on his motion when neither party submitted 
briefs and get it ruled on prior to trial. His failure to do so 
considerably lengthened the trial and wasted four (4) jurorfs 
valuable time. 
The State would argue that Ericksonfs failure to comply with 
these rules should constitute waiver of Erickson's objection to 
the evidence in question, pursuant to Rule 12(d), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
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CONCLUSION 
All of the issues raised by Erickson are based on factual 
deirerminatlona made by the Trial Court. While some of these 
decisions were "close calls" and were recognized as such by Judge 
Payne/ his determination was not and cannot be characterized as 
cJearly erroneous. Therefore, the decision of the Trial Court 
shotud be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of February, 1990. 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do'hereby certify that on the 2nd day of February, 1990, I 
mckn.Iud a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
R&SIKiKlMNT, postage -prepaid," to D. Bruce Oliver, DIUMENTI & 
LlffllSLKY, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 505 South Main 
Street, Bouirciiul, Utah 84010, by depositing the same in the 
Unites States lost Orfice at Roosevelt, Utah. 
Attorj^€?y_ _ {)(\ 
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RULES OF PRACTICE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURTS AND 
CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RULE 2.8 MOTIONS 
(c) The moving party may serve and file reply points and 
authorities within five (5) days after service of responding 
party's points and authorities. Upon the expiration of such five 
(5) day period to file reply points and authorities, either party 
may notify the clerk to submit the matter for decision. 
RULE 3.5 PRELIMINARY MOTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 
All pre-trial motions in criminal cases which require 
hearings upon the question of whether or not defendant is 
entitled to suppression of evidence shall be made and filed, and 
served upon the prosecuting attorney not less than five (5) days 
in advance of trial date. 
The motion, when filed, shall be immediately referred to a 
Judge for the purpose of taking evidence upon the question of 
suppression in order that the motion may be ruled upon prior to 
summoning of a jury for the trial of the action. 
RULE 12, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
ALSO KNOWN AS U.C.A. SECTION 77-35-12 
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by 
motion. A motion other than one made during a trial or hearing 
shall be in writing unless the court otherwise permits. It shall 
state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and 
shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported by 
affidavit or by evidence. 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request 
for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of 
determination without the trial of the general issue may be 
raised prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be 
raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(2) Motions concerning the admissibility of evidence. 
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before 
trial unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be 
deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are 
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its 
findings on the record. 
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or 
objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial 
or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, 
but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver. 
DTUMENTI & LIND3LB1Y 
Will Lam H. Llndsley #1966 
I), Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorneys for D3fondant 
505 South MaLn Street 
Bountiful, Utdh F4010 
Telephone: 29?-OM7 
CN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNT!, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT 
STATS OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
: AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
73. 
DON UVON BRICKSON, Ca3e No. 88 CR 124 
Defendant. 
MOTION 
Comes now demandant by and through h i s counse l , D. Bruce Oliver , 
attorney at lavi, and hereby moves the Court for an order to suppress any and 
alL evidence obtained pursuant to and including the i n i t i a l t r a f f i c stop on 
defendant pursuant to t h e F o u r t h , F i f t h and S i x t h Amendments to the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n of thu Uni t ed S t a t e s , and U.C.A. 77-35-12 (1982), and 
Constitution to th«5 S:ate of Utah, Article 1, Sections 7, 12 and 14. 
Dated th is «r*iL d a y o f December 1988. 
Jlj^j^di^ 
D. Bruce Oliver 
Attorney Cor Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Notioe is hereby given that a hearing attendant defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Evidenco has been scheJuled for January 26,
 f 19 89 , at the 
Please govern yourseLf ac3ordin&ly. 
Dated this day of December, 1988. 
AJ**.JdL 
D, Bruce Oliver 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that 1 mailed a copy of the foregoing this
 ( ) Q day 
of December 1088, to Herbert William Gillespie, Duchesne County Attorney, Box 
206, Duchesne, Utah 6*I0?1. 
^„1A^>A,: 
Q And is th.it the person seated next to the defense 
counsel? 
A Yes. 
I j MR. GILLESPIE: Your Honor, if the record could reflect 
j I this witness has also identified the defendant? 
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THE COURT: Any objections, Counsel? 
MR. OLIVEa: No objection. 
THE COURT: The record may so indicate, 
Q (By Mi:. Gillespie) What were :he circumstances of your 
seeing the defendant that evening? 
A Just want me to s:art from the first? 
Q If you'd like. 
A Okay. I'm a member of the Search & Rescue far Duchesne 
County and as such, the sheriff has asked us to be the eyes and 
ears in the county for him. And on that night, a call came across 
chat radio that thore was a dispute at the Johnny 01sen residence 
in Altona, and the officers that were on duty were approximately 
20 to 30 minutes a^ay from the scene. 
So, I went out to watch the roads to—according to the 
call, someone was leaving the scene, so I went to watch the area 
ta seu which direction the vehicle was going, so that I might be 
able to help the cfficerj EoLLow him or chase him down. 
g Okay, fad you see any vehicle leaving the scene? 
A 1 could--I didn't see the vehicle ^caving the scene, 
i could sea clearance lights going up the road, and 1 went west 
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i out of Altamont, to watch the lower end of the area. The caller 
2 from the scene said chat the truck was going out on the north 
3 end, 90 I turned around to go back up the Altona Road to v^here I 
4 couLd watch from the north end. 
5 J And at that point, Officer Mitchell came on the road 
6 I fifat intersects the road I was on, from hxb lioi«try-4i6h-wa£ 
7 I approximately a half a mile ahead of me, so I just followed him on 
8 tap the roacL When 1 got up-~went across the top of the hill thatfi 
! 
9 pn the road, he pul Led the defendant over, and I puLled up to his 
10 noana, went past both vehicles and got out ol my car and came 
U bick„ 
12 Q Did you actually see him pul] the defendant over? 
13 A No. 
14 Q Okay, And this area where you saw Deputy Mitchell and 
15 the defendant, this- would be obvious, but for the record, was that 
16 wit h m Duchesne County? 
1? A Yes. 
18 Q And what did you do when you, o r — 
19 A I got out of my car and came back to see if Officer 
j>0 Mitchell needed any assistance. When I reached him, he gave me 
21 the keys to the defendant'3 vehicle and said—told the defendant 
1% ] tc~*~that he was to remain */ith me. 
2j I MR. OLIVER: Objection, your Honor. Objection, this is 
It 1 hoax say that he's re latino now. 
MR* GILLESPIE: Your honor, that's background-
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1 out of AltcUTiont, to watch the lower end of the area. The caller 
2 from the scene said that the truck v/as going out on the north 
3 end,, so I turned around to go back up the Altona Road to \vhere I 
4 couLd watch from the north end. 
5 And at that point, Officer Mitchell came on the road 
6 that intersects the road I was on, from his home, he was 
7 [ approximately a half a mile ahead of m e , so I ^ust iollowod him on 
8 up the road. When 1 got up—went across the top of the hill that'4 
9 on th^ road , ho pxxlted the defendant over, and I pulled up to his 
10 tfcene, went past boch vehicles and got out of my car and came 
11 b ack * 
T ^ Did^^iauLac*tuallv .see him p u U the defendant over? 
13 A No. 
U Q Okay. Ard this acea where you saw Deputy Mitchell and 
15 the defendant, this, would be obvious, but for the record, was that 
16 within Duchesne County? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q And what did you do when you, or— 
19 A I got out of my car and came back to see if Officer 
20 Mitchell needed any assistance. When I reached him, hd gave me 
21 the keys to the defendant 13 vehicle and s a i d — t o l d the defendant 
22. tc~--that he v/as to remain */ith m e . 
Zi MR. OLCVER: Objection, your Honor. Objection, this is 
%$ 1 hedisay that he's relating now. 
I'J 
I 
MR. GILLESPIE: Your Honor, that's background. 
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